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As an agent of economic and social change, robotization has elicited considerable concern about
technological unemployment. Focusing on youth, this paper makes four contributions to the debate over this
labour-displacing technological change's effects. First, to clarify the magnitude of the job threat to young
people, the paper accentuates the conceptual distinction between technological unemployment and frictional
unemployment. Second, the possibility of persistent technological unemployment, which the young are
currently facing, is linked to strong uncertainty stemming from the rapidity of invention in robotics and
artificial intelligence. Third, the paper advances a plausibility-based argument about the inevitability of
technological unemployment. Fourth, coping behaviour is shown to be logically compatible with rationality
and well-suited to dealing with fear of joblessness. Fifth, to the extent that robotization threatens future jobs,
we maintain that coping strategies are needed to help members of the younger generation. A resilience-based
strategy is suggested but we believe that there may be other coping strategies complementary to our proposal.
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ABSTRACT. As an agent of economic and social change, robotization has elicited 
considerable concern about technological unemployment. Focusing on youth, this 
paper makes four contributions to the debate over this labour-displacing technological 
change’s effects. First, to clarify the magnitude of the job threat to young people, the 
paper accentuates the conceptual distinction between technological unemployment 
and frictional unemployment. Second, the possibility of persistent technological 
unemployment, which the young are currently facing, is linked to strong uncertainty 
stemming from the rapidity of invention in robotics and artificial intelligence. Third, 
the paper advances a plausibility-based argument about the inevitability of techno- 
logical unemployment. Fourth, coping behaviour is shown to be logically compatible 
with rationality and well-suited to dealing with fear of joblessness. Fifth, to the 
extent that robotization threatens future jobs, we maintain that coping strategies are 
needed to help members of the younger generation. A resilience-based strategy is 
suggested but we believe that there may be other coping strategies complementary to 
our proposal. 
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An important uncertainty associated with the introduction of innovations is 
the unpredictability of their impact on future generations. Labour-saving 
innovations have a long history as a source of worker anxiety. Concerns about 
workers who are thrown out of their jobs as a result of labour-displacing 
technologies go back at least to Ned Ludd’s destruction of two stocking 
frames in 1779 near Leicester, England. Recorded economic history shows, 
however, that the introduction of labour-saving innovations did not result in 
persistent technology induced unemployment and fear of joblessness remained 
bounded (Headrick, 2009).  
Of course, what was true in the past may not be true in the future. Due to 
the advance of robotics and artificial intelligence, the shadow of unemploy- 
ment caused by technical progress once again looms large on the horizon 
(Radinsky, 2015). At the forefront of current labour-saving technologies, 
robots have the potential to transform not just individual firms but whole 
industries and even entire economies. In our usage, “robot” functions as a 
cluster concept that “refers broadly to any sort of machinery, from computers 
to artificial intelligence programs, that provides a good substitute for work 
currently performed by humans” (Freeman, 2015: 2). Machines make cars, 
write articles, diagnose diseases, and are encroaching on all sorts of profes- 
sions, including but not limited to, teaching, accounting, and law. It is not 
unreasonable to ask: Will there be any jobs left for humans? This question is 
of vital importance to the life-chances and well-being of young people.  
The French social philosopher Bernard Stiegler, a scholar with a keen 
interest in how technology affects the younger generation, warns of an 
“immense transformation” (Stiegler, 2015: 126) as automation replaces jobs. 
Judging by recent work on this topic (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011; Ford, 
2015), simply telling young people to get more education, training and skills 
to protect themselves against the possibility of job loss is looking more like a 
questionable labour economistic mantra than unambiguously sound career 
advice. That such advice is still being given is perhaps no surprise; classic 
career theory has tended to ignore how career formation is disrupted by 
substantial economic change (Kanter, 1995). The whole notion of enhanced 
employability, to help young people deal with low job prospects and employ- 
ment insecurity, also now seems questionable (Crisp & Powell, 2016).  
This present conceptual paper contributes to the current debate over robots, 
technological unemployment, and youth job futures (see Peters, 2016). The 
pace with which robotization is advancing – we argue – means that young 
people are confronted by a job market wherein the nature of uncertainty has 
undergone a qualitative shift. The standard economic approach to labour 
market uncertainty – wherein all possible outcomes are known and proba- 
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bilities can be assigned to them – no longer applies. This is because of strong 
uncertainty, a concept that we explicate in 2.2. This uncertainty, in turn, has 
implications for what is, and what is not a rational response on the part both 
of young jobseekers and policymakers seeking to bolster the life-chances of 
this population group. In a nutshell, under these uncertainty conditions 
coping behaviour, far from being inherently irrational, is supremely rational. 
Coping strategies, therefore, cannot be ruled out by economists and other 
social scientists who prize rational behaviour and policy responses built on 
that foundation. Ultimately, our paper provides a justificatory framework for 
discussing the plausibility of designing a strategy to help young people cope 
with the challenge of the current wave of labour-displacing technological 
change. 
Our article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces working defini- 
tions of the key concepts we employ. Technological unemployment (2.1) 
resolves conceptual imprecision in the literature. Strong uncertainty (2.2) is a 
necessary building block to discuss whether the economy is moving towards 
robot induced technological unemployment. Shackle’s potential surprise 
theory (2.3) is used to make a plausibility-based argument that this unem- 
ployment is not unlikely. Section 3 focuses on coping with uncertainty. 
Rationality of coping behaviour (3.1) demonstrates logically that coping 
behaviour is a rational response to life under conditions of strong uncertainty. 
Crafting a coping strategy (3.2) offers some suggestions for a resilience-
based strategy to help members of the younger generation deal with the job 
threat posed by robotization. Section 4 consists of a summary and some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Key Theoretical Concepts 
 
This section seeks to introduce greater conceptual rigour into the debate over 
the socioeconomic impact of robotization. Imprecise use of theoretical 
concepts is an impediment to rational argumentation, because clearly defined 
concepts are the basic building blocks of logical reasoning. The latter is a 
prerequisite to understanding and therefore effectively responding to social 
problems – in this case, the effects of robots on the job prospects of the 
young. We focus on two key concepts: (a) technological unemployment, and 
(b) uncertainty. These, we argue, are related in the sense that a particular 
type of uncertainty results from technological unemployment, as we define it.  
 
2.1. Technological unemployment 
Far from being self-evident, technological unemployment is conceptually a 
subtle notion that dates back to the days of the classical economist David 
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Ricardo (1772–1823). The shibboleth at the time was “the machinery ques- 
tion,” as posed by Ricardo, namely whether machinery reduced the demand 
for labour. In the third (and last edition) of The Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation, published in 1821, Ricardo added a new chapter 
entitled “On Machinery,” in which he analysed the effect on the economy of 
the introduction of machinery. With regard to wage-earners, Ricardo’s con- 
viction was striking: 
 
I am convinced that the opinion entertained by the labouring class, 
that employment of machinery is frequently detrimental to their 
interests, is not founded on prejudice and error, but is conformable 
to the correct principles of political economy. (Ricardo, 1911: 264) 
 
After two centuries, the machinery question is back on the agenda. In the 
wider literature on the socioeconomic impact of robotics and artificial in- 
telligence, however, there is no generally agreed definition of technological 
unemployment. Danaher’s (2016) attempt to identify two different versions 
– short-term and long-term – shows that technological unemployment is a 
contested concept. The intuition behind the concept is that new technologies 
displace workers faster than the economy can find new jobs for them. This 
idea is, in fact, evident in the work of John Maynard Keynes, the first 
economist who explicitly defined the term: 
 
We are being affected with a new disease of which some readers 
may not have yet heard the name, but of which they will hear a 
great deal in the years to come – namely, technological unemploy- 
ment. This means unemployment due to our discovery of means of 
economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can 
find new uses for labour. (Keynes, 1930: 325, original emphasis)  
 
Thus, according to Keynes, the defining characteristic of technological 
unemployment is that the pace at which new uses of labour are found is less 
than the pace of the number of jobs taken by machines. This definition is so 
commonplace that it is used intuitively in the literature on robotization (cf. 
Marchant, Stevens, & Hennessy, 2014; Saner & Wallach, 2015). Unfortu- 
nately, however, intuitive understandings can lead to technological unem- 
ployment being conflated with frictional unemployment. A recent paper on 
machine intelligence by Loi (2015) is a case in point. 
Certainly, Keynes’s definition captures one of the distinguishing features 
of the concept in question, namely: the rate at which the system economizes 
the use of labour is greater than the rate of creation of new jobs. This intuitive 
definition is good as a first approximation but not as a second because it 
remains silent about a critical point: do the workers displaced by new tech- 
nologies ever get a job? New technologies such as, for example, the growing 
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ubiquity of self-checkout at supermarkets and drug stores may temporarily 
displace workers but a growing economy may quickly create jobs for these 
workers. The intuitive definition renders technological unemployment obser- 
vationally equivalent to frictional unemployment.1 
In order to elaborate our alternative definition of technological unemploy- 
ment, a piece of notation is necessary here. Let R(t) and H(t) be the number 
of jobs taken by robots and the number of jobs taken by humans in year t, 
respectively. We assume that each job can be performed either by a person 
or by a robot, each person performs only one job, and the decision to allocate 
a worker or a robot to a particular job is dictated by cost-minimization. The 
number of unemployed people U(t) is the difference between the number of 
workers willing to take a job at the prevailing wage rate N(t) and the total 
number of employed people, that is, U(t) = N(t) – H(t)). Technological 
unemployment only occurs when the increase in the number of jobs taken by 
robots in t + 1 is greater than the number of jobs taken by humans in t + 1, 
that is, R(t+1) – R(t) > H(t + 1) – H(t).  
The economy that we have in mind is a competitive, profit-oriented, 
market-guided economy displaying economic growth and population growth. 
Robots or smart machines are means of economizing the use of labour. This 
signals that the prime mover of human replacement is the profit motive. It is 
clear that labour-saving technological change means that machines provoke 
human replacement at the workplace. What may not be as obvious is that – 
according to our alternative definition – this sort of technological change 
does not necessarily imply technological unemployment; the net effect may 
simply be frictional unemployment. Furthermore, frictional unemployment 
(namely, the unemployment that arises from the process by which workers 
find appropriate jobs given their skills and tastes) is captured by U(t).  
 
2.2. Strong uncertainty 
A univocal concept has a single meaning and one empirical referent. Uncer- 
tainty is not like that; there are different forms of uncertainty. The uncer- 
tainty resulting from the operation of the economy today is qualitatively 
different from the uncertainty individuals and businesses experienced under 
capitalism in the twentieth century. A distinction between two kinds of 
uncertainty introduced by the American economist Frank H. Knight (1885–
1973) almost a century ago is particularly relevant today. Everyone knows 
that uncertainty means that we do not know what is going to happen. What 
Knight emphasized was that when dealing with uncertainty one has to be 
aware of a key dichotomy.  
Paraphrasing Knight (1965), one can say that sometimes we face weak 
uncertainty in that we are able to specify all the possible outcomes together 
with their corresponding probabilities (e.g. buying a lottery ticket). At other 
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times, we face strong uncertainty where it is not possible to define, or even 
imagine, all future outcomes, so probabilities cannot therefore be attached to 
them. A simple thought experiment can clarify this conceptual distinction.2 
Suppose time travelling to the past is possible; locate oneself at the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century, and then try to imagine the launching of the 
Internet in 1995. The point is that, in the case of fundamental technological 
shifts, past experiences and events are no guide to future developments and 
outcomes.  
As we shall see, this bifurcation of the concept of uncertainty has profound 
implications not only for thinking about how young people might deal with 
the effects of labour-displacing technological change on their life chances, 
but also for what it means to be rational. To the extent that reasoning about 
future states of affairs is based on probabilities, it is inductive in nature. Yet, 
under conditions of strong uncertainty inductive (probabilistic) reasoning fails, 
to the extent that “the future will not be relevantly like the past” (Feser, 2017: 
152). If the future is not going to be relevantly like the past, being rational in 
the sense of developing arguments based on probabilities is, therefore,  
impossible. Below we switch to plausibility as the criterion for trying to 
determine robotization’s effects on employment.  
 
2.3. From probability to plausibility: Shackle’s potential surprise theory 
In view of strong uncertainty, should scholars give up any hope of identify- 
ing the likely employment outcomes of robotization? We think not. One 
possibility is to use G.L.S. Shackle’s Potential Surprise Theory (PST) to 
advance an argument to support the hypothesis that robotization is not actually 
going to be employment-creating, and, in consequence, that there is a real 
likelihood of technological unemployment developing.  
PST theory is suitable for the task at hand for the simple reason that it is 
based on plausibility rather than probability (Shackle, 1938). Shackle’s most 
enduring contribution was to show why probability is an inappropriate means 
for considering any sort of possible development – including employment 
futures – under strong uncertainty. In fact, Shackle identified the Achilles 
heel of probability theory: the problem of “additivity” (Shackle, 1955: 68–74). 
Broadly speaking, this problem can be described as follows. The Kolmogorov 
axioms which underpin probability theory postulate that all possible outcomes 
are known in advance (the problem is said to be “closed”), that is, the 
probability that one out of all outcomes comprising the outcome space will 
occur is equal to one. Under circumstances of strong uncertainty, the future 
is open and therefore the problem is not a closed one. 
Though there is an extensive academic literature on PST it is not neces- 
sary, for this paper’s purposes, to rehearse the debates. Instead, we draw on 
work by Earl and Littleboy (2014) and Zappia (2014) that channels Shackle’s 
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argument. The broad lines are as follows. When analysts evaluate the 
plausibility of occurrence of a future outcome (FO) under current conditions, 
they tend to envisage two polar cases to frame the analysis: the occurrence of 
FO seems completely impossible (PC1) and the occurrence of the FO seems 
completely possible. It is clear that the analysts can establish a correspondence 
between “degree of belief” (how possible or impossible the FO seems) or 
“degree of plausibility” and “degree of surprise.” Given a posited FO, how 
surprised would the analysts be if this outcome occurred? While in polar 
case PC1 the analysts would be very surprised indeed with the occurrence of 
the FO, exactly the opposite would happen with polar case PC2; that is, the 
analysts would not be surprised at all with the occurrence of FO (see Table 
1). 
 
Table 1 Outline of PST 
Polar 
case 
FO: occurrence seems Degree of plausibility Degree of 
surprise 
PC1 Completely impossible Null  Absolute 
PC2 Completely possible Absolute Null 
 
It is our view that the FO described as “creative destruction associated with 
robotization will create more human jobs in total than it destroys” (or, to put it 
somewhat roughly, “robotization will be economy-wide labour-augmenting”) 
lacks plausibility.  
Why will labour-saving technological change this time not be, as it has 
been before, employment-creating? There is a good reason to believe that the 
current round of labour-saving technological change is different. Robotization 
not only replaces muscular effort but also mental functions involved in many 
productive activities, and thereby, renders human labour increasingly super- 
fluous. The empirical evidence suggests that almost anything a human can do, 
robots can do better (Nazareth, 2015; Hanson, 2016). This point has economic 
corollaries. Firstly, the ability of the service sector to absorb displaced human 
labour may well be diminished because the creation of increasingly efficient 
robots seems to have no limits (Ford, 2015). Consider the case of hotels 
where the concierge is a robot and that of robots assisting residents in 
nursing homes. Secondly, we are aware of no published evidence to support 
the view that technological responses to changes in factor prices resulting 
from the incessant introduction of robot-based products will lead to the 
creation of labour-intensive tasks. Each of these points lends credence to the 
(labour-augmenting) FO’s implausibility.  
Now, detractors may argue that the FO is in fact highly plausible based 
on historical experience. To argue this way involves drawing inferences about 
events in the future from events in the past. A typical argument would be 
that, in the past – when people had exactly the same fears about technical 
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progress as they have today – in every instance the increased automation 
resulted in a rise in employment due to its labour productivity-enhancing 
effects, and the consequences of this for aggregate demand. Following this 
train of thought, automation is a double-edged sword. Unemployment due to 
new technology worsens income inequality and wealth disparity, but these 
are offset by gains in productivity and economic growth.  
Yet, for two reasons we disagree that the preceding argument holds in the 
case of robotization. The first is that incessant innovation in robotics and 
artificial intelligence may generate an immiserating vicious circle. New and 
improved robots may bring about a wealth transfer from relatively unskilled 
young people to ourselves that leaves not just young people, but rather all our 
descendants worse off. Indeed, assume that new versions of robots substitute 
directly for young unskilled labour, but complement older skilled labour. 
The depression in wages of the young then limits their ability to invest in 
their own skill acquisition (for example, pursuing tertiary studies becomes 
increasingly difficult) and in physical capital (think of housing unafford- 
ability). This, in turn, means that the next generation of young, initially 
unskilled workers encounter an economy with less human capital, which 
further drives down their wages. As a result, robotization may entail each 
new generation being worse off that their predecessor. 
Our second point is that any claim about automation tending to increase 
employment must, of necessity, be based on historical extrapolations – which 
are difficult to ground under conditions of strong uncertainty (Staley, 2002). 
To be sure, our application of PST requires openness to understanding the 
connection between past, present, and future in terms of discontinuity rather 
than continuity or linear progress (Sewell, 2005). Yet, in the domain of tech- 
nology, this is not without precedent. Schwab (2017), for one, argues that the 
fourth industrial revolution – of which artificial intelligence is the sine qua 
non – is reshaping the socioeconomic landscape in a manner qualitatively 
different from the preceding three such revolutions. Similarly, Barrat (2013) 
maintains we are entering a technological new era. The implication is clear: 
under frame-breaking technological change, the future is not merely a rerun 
of the past. Taken together, the various complementary points adduced above 
that offset robotization’s potential for productivity-enhancement – namely: 
the service sector’s limited absorptiveness, the lack of evidence about the 
effects of changing factor prices, the real possibility of an immiserating 
vicious circle, and the support Schwab and Barrat lend to the technological 
discontinuity thesis – allow us to draw what Spitzer (2015: 280) in another 
connection terms an “informal inference”: the FO is implausible. Given this 
inference, one should not be surprised if technological unemployment even- 
tuates. The results of the application of PST to robotization are summarized 
in Table 2.  
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3. Uncertainty and Coping 
 
With robotization developing apace, if it is correct to claim that increasing 
technological unemployment is a highly plausible occurrence, then one basic 
question immediately suggests itself. How can social scientists help young 
people to deal with the distress, despair and social dislocation that the jobless- 
ness threat is likely to cause? Job search under conditions of uncertainty is 
known to provoke negative emotions (Standing, 2011; Wilson & Ebert, 2013), 
but the basis of the knowledge on which career advice can be given to the 
young is less than solid. For one thing, the extent of technological unem- 
ployment – the phenomenon’s quantitative dimension – cannot be known in 
advance. For another thing, optimization of any sort is out of the question 
precisely because of strong uncertainty (which, to recapitulate, means that 
the best that can be provided is a plausibility argument concerning employ- 
ment futures). A recent contribution by King (2016) provides a potential 
solution to the puzzle. The point forcibly made by King is that under con- 
ditions of strong uncertainty, a decision-maker has essentially two options: 
do nothing or engage in “coping behaviour.” 
 
3.1. Rationality of coping behaviour 
To understand the crucial role of coping behaviour for decision making in 
general, it is helpful to pause for a moment to identify the distinguishing 
features of the concept itself. The loosest possible definition of coping 
behaviour is based on human nature. Humans seek to deal effectively with a 
changing reality by adapting and reacting, that is, by coping with the situation. 
The notion of coping behaviour is subtle. Optimizing behaviour and coping 
behaviour, in our view, are not mutually exclusive. Rather, optimizing 
behaviour is a particular case of coping behaviour. For example, in a free-
market economy the behaviour of businesses is consistent with the maxim- 
ization of expected profits in the short-run. When the circumstances change, 
profit-maximizing firms respond by adjusting the optimal levels of production. 
When people confront strong uncertainty they respond and adapt as well, but 
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the maximization of expected returns is not possible simply because the 
specification of all future outcomes is out of the question. Trying to optimize 
under strong uncertainty is like performing plastic surgery on an invisible 
patient; it is irrational. A syllogism can be used to summarize our argument:  
 
(1) The pursuit of the impossible is irrational. (premise) 




(3) Optimizing under strong uncertainty is irrational.  
 
Figuratively, strong uncertainty creates an ignorance zone. The decision 
maker has to narrow down the ignorance zone and develop rules for sound 
decisions. Following King (2016), coping behaviour under conditions of 
strong uncertainty is based on a narrative and a set of heuristics. A narrative 
articulates pieces of information that appear to be relevant in order to narrow 
down the ignorance zone. The purpose of a narrative is twofold. It allows us 
to think about the future in qualitative terms and provides a platform for 
choosing the relevant heuristic. The heuristic, in turn, comprises rules of 
thumb to deal with different problems within the narrative. An obvious and 
not unimportant example is business innovation. Some innovative companies 
create a corporate motto such as “innovation everywhere and for everyone” 
to explain to staff members why the firm must be better at innovation. This 
narrative is accompanied by rules of thumb such as the new product must hit 
the market first, be underpinned by a superb technology, be three times better 
than the existing ones in relation to price, speed, and convenience, and so on. 
The foregoing distinctions can be summarized in tabular form (see Table 
3). One further issue implicit in Table 3 must be made explicit. Is coping 
behaviour always rational? At first glance, it would appear that coping 
behaviour under strong uncertainty is irrational because optimizing is out of 
the question. Simply put, there is nothing to be maximized or minimized. 
 
Table 3 Two kinds of uncertainty 










It should be clear that coping behaviour is a rational way to make decisions 
under conditions of weak uncertainty. In fact, rationality in the context of 
weak uncertainty means that the decision maker optimizes a well-defined 
objective function such as an expected returns function or a stochastic utility 
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function. This explains why economists tend to conflate rationality with 
optimization.  
A brief technical digression is worthwhile here. Optimization is a proper 
subset of mathematics, and mathematics is a proper subset of formal logic. 
Logical inference includes both formal logic and mathematics. Mathematical 
reasoning is essentially logical in character but mathematics necessitates the 
introduction of a concept foreign to formal logic: the concept of “infinity” 
(the infinitely large and the infinitely continuous). In brief, mathematics is 
formal logic extended in a particular direction to include the infinite as well 
as the finite. 
Logical reasoning cannot and should not be identified with logical in- 
ference. Logical inference is a process of reasoning in which, granted the 
truth of the premises (assumptions), and if there are no errors in reasoning, 
the conclusions must be true. For example, assume that a firm maximizes 
profits. If the profit function is differentiable and gives rise to an inverted U 
profit curve, profit-maximization implies with logical compulsion that 
marginal revenue must be equal to marginal cost. In reliable inference the 
reasoning conducive to the conclusions does not enjoy logical compulsion, 
but there are reasons to believe that the conclusions are correct. For example, 
assuming economic freedom, private property, and many other conditions 
concerning institutions, labour market efficiency, and so forth, economists 
have reasons to believe that economic prosperity will follow. 
Here is the critical point: coping behaviour is also a rational way of 
making decisions when the future is unknowable, when optimization is 
impossible and the most that can be used as a guide is plausibility-based 
envisioning. Under strong uncertainty, coping behaviour is rational in the 
sense that it is agreeable to reason and sound judgement. Logical inference is 
not ruled out, but reliable inference appears to be an essential ingredient of 
any coping strategy under strong uncertainty.  
 
3.2. Crafting a coping strategy 
Returning to the basic question, we believe that the answer requires the design 
of a coping strategy. The lineaments of a supporting narrative are not hard to 
sketch. Pervasive diffusion of information about the inexorable advance of 
robotization is needed to generate individual alertness and socio-political 
responsiveness. Arguably, a nascent narrative of that type is presently 
emerging.3 As contributors to this journal have recently observed, the 
creation and promulgation of narratives is central to envisaging better futures 
(Milojevic & Iniyatulla, 2015; Iniyatulla, Izgarjan, Kuusi, & Minkkinen, 
2016). The central focus of the narrative in question would emphasize that 
robotization, despite being ineluctable, is a challenge to prevail over and not 
an immitigable threat. Then, to combat individual and social despair, a 
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positive mindset can be encouraged and reinforced with a set of heuristics. 
Fostering social hope is the goal.  
When it comes to heuristics, it would be reasonable to start with a 
common-sense rule of thumb: invest in social skills formation. Humans have 
a competitive advantage over robots in social interactional skills. One of the 
policy implications of the empirical work carried out by Frey and Osborne 
(2013) is that skills formation should be directed to social skills that robots, 
by their very nature, would find it difficult to acquire. Yet, as we have 
previously argued (2.3), the service industries where these skills are vital 
may simply not be able to absorb enough people who need jobs. As a result, 
we believe that resilience-enhancing emotion management skills must not 
only be added to the list of humans’ competitive advantages; they must be 
accorded primacy. Increased resilience, we aver, can avert defeatism and 
hopelessness, and thus equip young people to confront the robotization chal- 
lenge head-on.  
Resilience has separable (but not unrelated) individual psychological and 
social systemic dimensions (Masten, 2014). At the individual level resilience 
denotes personal attributes such as being adaptable and possessing an inner 
strength that allows for positive adjustment to adverse circumstances (Bell, 
2001). Positive psychologists have done much work on these attributes. For 
example, Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) stress “psychological flexibility” 
in confronting situations of change. Also prized is “the ability to bounce 
back from negative emotional experiences” (Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 
2004: 1168). This school of thought argues that all young people have the 
potential to be resilient; it is a potential that can be both actualized and 
augmented (Waller, 2001).  
Yet resilience is not only an attribute possessed by individuals; wider 
ecological systems and social systems can also be resilient (Brand & Jax, 
2007). Indeed, the social-ecological literature provides conceptual resources 
for finding more rules of thumb. The content of the social ecology concept 
of resilience is not dissimilar to the content of its psychological counterpart. 
Though the emphasis is on adapting to changing environmental conditions (cf. 
Pelling, 2011; Nelson, Adger, & Brown, 2007), strong uncertainty features 
centrally in this field of enquiry (even if it is not explicitly named as such). 
The concept of social resilience can easily be transposed across to the basic 
question. Resilient socioeconomic arrangements provide material support to 
those in need, as wider processes of economic, political and social trans- 
formation occur apace. Robotization is a case in point. One proposal, for 
example, is to mitigate robotization-driven income inequality by increasing 
worker ownership of capital (Freeman, 2015).  
What makes individual-level and social-level resilience a sensible enabling 
strategy for coping with the effects of robotization on future jobs? The answer 
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lies in the concept of strong uncertainty itself. Strong uncertainty means that 
academics, policymakers, subject-matter experts of all stripes, and members 
of the general public to boot, simply do not know how widespread the job 
loss due to robotization is going to be. As a result, investing in measures to 
increase the broad preparedness of young people to face that future, and 
empowering them as citizens to shape that future, is just as rational, if not 
more so, than targeting the formation of specific job-focused skills – which 
may be outmoded before any such skills formation strategy comes to fruition.  
The psychological literature is replete with proposals to boost resilience 
in the young (Masten & O’Dougherty Wright, 2010). It would take us too far 
afield to comment on the many possible approaches, so we discuss just one: 
mindfulness training. This meditative training seeks to evoke, elicit, and 
extend the potential young people already possess for dealing with adversity. 
The vast literature on mindfulness training offers many perspectives that can 
be useful for dealing with the robotization challenge (e.g. Jacobs & Blustein, 
2008; Monshat et al., 2011). We will briefly comment only on a handful of 
recent contributions as an illustration of the fruitful insights than can be 
found in the literature in question.  
Roeser (2014) provides a systematic review of the human developmental 
theses that underpin the targeting of a specific population group – young 
people – through a mindfulness approach within school settings. There are 
two points of interest closely related to our basic question. First, young people 
tend to be better absorbers of mindfulness training (Roeser, 2014: 384). 
Second, mindfulness is one of the “evolved, early-arising capacities of human 
beings” but it needs “cultural training and support to fully flower” (Roeser, 
2014: 385). These points suggest that school-based mindfulness training – on 
which there are many studies attesting to its resilience-enhancing effects (for 
a review, see Meiklejohn et al., 2012) – can help young people to be resilient 
in the face of the challenge posed by robotization. A recent study attests to 
the complementarity between the inculcation of mindfulness and the creation 
and sustenance of a future-oriented “narrative of hope” (Moses and Chowd- 
hury, 2016: 456).  
Further, as suggested by political scientists and educationists (Mathiowetz, 
2016; Comstock, 2015; Hyde & LaPrad, 2015), mindfulness training is a 
forming ground of democratic citizens. If the cited authors are correct, this 
training can – through its effect on political engagement – build social 
resilience. This is important because increased social resilience does not just 
happen; in a liberal democratic environing context it requires a concerned, 
critically engaged citizenry prepared to push policymakers to respond to the 
robotization challenge. Whether this is through extending worker ownership 
(as per Freeman’s suggestion mentioned above), creating a guaranteed basic 
income, or some other means is immaterial. Absent a citizenry actively 
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engaged in politics, resilient social arrangements are unlikely to develop; 
they need a political spur.  
 
4. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
Due to the strong uncertainty provoked by the dizzying speed of invention in 
robotics and artificial intelligence, whether robotization will cause techno- 
logical unemployment, and the extent of this unemployment, is a pressing 
question. As we have argued (2.3), the notion that technological unemploy- 
ment is inevitable is, at minimum, plausible. This unquestionably raises the 
spectre of joblessness. To the extent that this has the potential to provoke 
despair in young people, the question of how to deal with the problem is 
pushed to the forefront of labour studies.  
This paper’s discussion of the phenomenon of technological unemploy- 
ment and its corollary, strong uncertainty, is an important steppingstone to 
finding an answer. The existence of strong uncertainty in a fundamental way 
rules out any attempt at optimization. This uncertainty also rules out probabil- 
istic reasoning and inductive argumentation along with it. How is it possible 
to be rational when thinking about future developments when inductive 
reasoning fails? In these circumstances, we believe, a rational response to the 
robotization challenge can be crafted using the notion of coping behaviour. 
Coping behaviour under conditions of strong uncertainty is based on two 
pillars: a narrative and a set of heuristics. A specific description of these two 
pillars leads to a coping strategy. 
In broad terms, the coping strategy we have suggested can be easily sum- 
marized. The narrative consists of providing information to the populace about 
the pervasive diffusion of robotics and its potentially devastating economic 
consequences. This would avoid the tendency towards complacency and 
denial that happens whenever existential threats occur (Wittes & Blum, 
2015). The central focus of the narrative would emphasize that robotization 
is a challenge over which humanity can prevail, rather than a threat to which 
it will succumb. This would avoid a culture of defeatism and reinforce a 
positive, proactive frame of mind. Positive psychology is the narrative’s 
legitimating scholarly prop. As to the set of heuristics, we proffer a triad of 
rules of thumb: investment in uniquely human social and emotional skills, 
resilience arrangements to allow positive adjustment, and a mindfulness 
approach to strengthen the power of resilience.  
This topic cannot be dealt with exhaustively in a few pages. Still, it would 
not be difficult to amplify the foregoing argument or to find new avenues of 
research to design complementary answers to our paper’s basic question. We 
hope to have carried the analysis far enough to provide a broad framework in 




1. Parenthetically, it is worthwhile mentioning that Keynes (1930: 325) goes on 
to say that “this is only a temporary phase of maladjustment,” predicting a future of 
leisure and plenty one hundred years hence. This prophecy was reinforced by 
Schumpeter’s 1942 encomium to “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 2010). 
2. Due to the concept’s equivocal nature, the language of uncertainty can be 
confusing. The original dichotomy introduced by Knight (in a work first published 
in 1921) was risk/uncertainty, not weak uncertainty/strong uncertainty. For Knight, 
“risk” is “measurable uncertainty” and “true uncertainty” is “unmeasurable uncer- 
tainty” (Knight, 1965: 20). In another vein, strong uncertainty is tantamount to what 
environmental scholars, especially in the domain of climate change, refer to as “deep 
uncertainty” (Kasperson, 2008).  
3. That such a public narrative is emergent is illustrated, for example, by the 
recent newspaper article by Avent (2016): “Robots will eventually do all our jobs, 
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